Filed under: Uncategorized
By Bob Perillo
In Colombia, Dole does business with people associated with paramilitary activity, drug trafficking and money laundering.
According to Dole’s own website, it does business with “the Daabon Group of the Dávila family,” one of the most powerful families in Magdalena.[1] “Daabon” stands for Dávila Abondano. The Dávila Abondano family has been in the news lately in Colombia, as part of a mushrooming scandal surrounding the Colombian government’s channeling of huge agricultural subsidies to supporters of President Alvaro Uribe’s second re-election. The Daabon Group produces bananas and African palm oil.
The stated purpose of the Colombian government’s agricultural subsidy program, “Agro Ingreso Seguro” (“Secure Agricultural Income”) is to “promote productivity and competitiveness, reduce rural inequality and to prepare the farming sector to confront the challenge of economic globalization.”[2] Nevertheless, the bulk of the program’s subsidies have gone to a handful of powerful families in Magdalena province close to Uribe. These include the Dávila Abondano family, which received hundreds of thousands of dollars in government handouts.[3] Another wing of the Dávila clan, the Dávila Jimeno family, also received hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of subsidies.[4] All told, the Dávilas received over $1 million for irrigation and drainage projects from Colombian taxpayers, despite the fact that this family is among the richest on the Caribbean coast, where Dole produces its Colombian bananas.
A member of this family, Raúl Dávila Jimeno, has long been known by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency as a drug trafficker:
“In 1979, a joint DEA/FBI task force in Miami immobilized the Black Tuna Gang, a major marijuana smuggling ring responsible for bringing 500 tons of marijuana into the United States over a 16-month period. The Black Tuna gang derived its name from the radio code name for a mysterious Colombian sugar grower and drug dealer, Raul Davila-Jimeno, who was the major supplier of the organization. Many of the gang members wore solid-gold medallions bearing a black tuna emblem. The medallions served as a talisman and symbol of their membership in this smuggling group. With the assistance of this small private army, Davila, who called himself a sugar, coffee, and petroleum exporter, virtually ruled Santa Marta [Magdalena], Colombia, where the majority of Colombian marijuana was grown. It was a highly organized ring, with gang members maintaining security and eavesdropping on radio frequencies used by police and U.S. Customs officials.”[5]
A person named Juan Manuel Dávila Jimeno, presumably a close relative, is listed as the legal representative of a banana plantation in Magdalena, “Lucía,” that we believe has produced bananas for Dole.[6]
On December 1, 2008, José Domingo Dávila Armenta, ex-Governor of Magdalena, was arrested and charged with his role in the “Chivolo Pact,” an illegal agreement signed by over 400 political leaders of Magdalena with the AUC Northern Block paramilitaries, in September 2000, which allowed Dávila Armenta to become Governor of Magdalena in 2001.[7] The ex-Governor’s brother, Eduardo Enrique Dávila Armenta, was arrested on April 16, 1994 after the authorities found approximately two tons of marijuana on one of his properties in Santa Marta. As a result, in 1996 he was sentenced to 10 years in jail; he was given an early release in 2001.[8] But the Prosecutor’s office issued a warrant for Eduardo Enrique Dávila Armenta in February 2009, for his involvement with Northern Block paramilitaries.[9] Dávila Armenta turned himself in on March 9, 2009.[10] After his arrest, Eduardo Enrique Dávila Armenta was also charged with homicide on April 1, 2009 in the murder of socialite Carmen Josefa Vergara Díazgranados, who was murdered on January 18, 2007.[11]
Eduardo Enrique Dávila Armenta appealed his drug-trafficking conviction to the Colombian Supreme Court, but the court refused to overturn his conviction in 2001.[12] In his appeal, one of Dávila Armenta’s arguments was that the property where the marijuana was found, Villa Concha, did not belong to him personally, but was held by a corporation, of which Rose Marie Dávila Armenta (presumably the sister of Eduardo Enrique and ex-Governor José Domingo) was the manager.[13] Rose Marie Dávila Armenta appears in public documents as the legal representative of two banana plantations in Magdalena, “Lola” and “Mangos,” that, we believe, have produced bananas for Dole.[14]
In 2004, a judge ruled that 6 Billion Pesos (approximately $2.4 Million) worth of Eduardo Enrique Dávila Armenta’s assets, as well as his 25% stake in the Unión Magdalena soccer team, should be seized under drug-trafficking-related asset-forfeiture laws.[15] But Dávila Armenta apparently had a protector high up in the Colombian government, in the person of Jorge Noguera, then the Director of the DAS, Colombia’s principal intelligence agency. Noguera resigned in 2005 and was later prosecuted for his role in “DAS-Gate,” the scandal involving the DAS’s links to the AUC paramilitaries.[16] Among other crimes, Noguera obstructed government efforts to seize Dávila Armenta’s drug-related assets, as reported in Semana.com:
“According to the Procurator’s Office, Noguera anomalously removed highly qualified investigators from the DAS’s financial investigations unit, when he found out that they had discovered that relatives [of Noguera] were being investigated for drug-money laundering. Part of the investigation involved moving forward with a process to seize 600 assets held in the name of the Dávila Armenta family, among which four appeared in the name of Maruja Cotes de Noguera, Noguera’s mother. … ‘It’s remarkable that members of the Dávila Armenta family were sentenced for drug trafficking, … which is what gave rise to the asset seizure applied against them, all of which could not be unknown to Doctor Noguera, given his business relationship with that family.’”[17]
The Dávila family has long-documented ties to drug trafficking, and has been firmly linked to the Northern Block paramilitaries and the principal intelligence agency, DAS, itself tainted with paramilitary ties.
[1] Dole Organic Program, http://www.doleorganic.com/farms/780/colombia-la-guajira-daabon-group-shangrila-farm.html (accessed June 24, 2009). According to the Dole website, the Daabon Group also owns another Dole organic producer, Don Diego, located in Santa Marta, Magdalena; see: http://www.doleorganic.com/farms/773/colombia-santa-marta-daabon-group-don-diego-farm.html (accessed August 3, 2009).
[2] Cambio, “Programa Agro Ingreso Seguro ha beneficiado a hijos de políticos y reinas de belleza”, (“Secure Agricultural Income Program Has Benefitted Children of Politicians and Beauty Queens,” [undated]. Available at: http://www.cambio.com.co/paiscambio/847/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_CAMBIO-6185730.html (accessed Dec. 10, 2009).
[3] Elespectador.com, “Los subsidies hacen viable los proyectos”, (“Subsidies make projects viable”), October 5, 2009. Available at: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/investigacion/articulo165087-los-subsidios-hacen-viables-los-proyectos (accessed Dec. 10, 2009).
[4] Cambio, supra.
[5] DEA History Book 1975 – 1980, “The Black Tuna Gang and Operation Banco,” U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. Available at: http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/1975-1980.html (accessed July 22, 2009).
[6] “Listado Definitivo de Productores Elegibles para Acceder al Incentivo Sanitario para Banano 2008” (“Definitive List of Producers Eligible for the Sanitary Incentive for Bananas 2008”), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Colombian Institute of Agriculture. Pp. 10 and 27. Available at: http://www.ica.gov.co/getdoc/48887900-7e90-4056-9d59-2d05f5eabbe5/Listado_def_incentivobanano2008.aspx (accessed July 22, 2009).
[7] Semana.com, “Capturado el ex gobernador de Magdalena por ‘Pacto de Chivolo’” (“Ex Governor of Magdalena Arrested for ‘Chivolo Pact’”). December 2, 2008. Available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/capturado-exgobernador-magdalena-pacto-chivolo/118338.aspx (accessed July 29, 2009). The relevant text (my translation): “Yesterday in Tasajera, Ciénaga, the ex-Governor of the department of Magdalena, José Domingo Dávila Armenta, elected in October of 2000 for the period 2001—2003, was arrested. Dávila was travelling from Barranquilla to Santa Marta when he was stopped by agents from the CTI and the Prosecutor General’s office. A case was opened against the ex-Governor for having signed and benefitted from the ‘Chivolo Pact,’ an agreement signed in September 2001 between the groups of paramilitaries of the Northern Block, commanded by Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias ‘Jorge 40,’ with municipal council members, mayors and congressional representatives, as well as with aspiring candidates for these offices, and to the 29 mayors’ offices and municipalities of the department.”
[8] Primerapágina.com, “Extinguidos bienes por $6.000 millones y el 25% del Unión Magdalena a Eduardo Dávila Armenta por narcotráfico” (“Assets worth 6 Billion Pesos [about $2.4 Million] and 25% of Unión Magdalena [soccer team] seized from Eduardo Dávila Armenta for Drug Trafficking”], October 6, 2004. Available at: http://www.primerapagina.com.co/MostrarDocumentoPublico.aspx?id=1105164 (accessed July 31, 2009). The relevant text (my translation): “Dávila Armenta was sentenced on November 8, 1996 by a regional judge in Barranquilla to serve 10 years in prison for drug trafficking. The police found two tons of marijuana on one of his properties.” … “The sentenced was reduced to six years for good behavior, and he served part of it in his home. In 2001 he recovered his freedom.”
[9] Verdadabierta.com, “Fiscalía ordena captura del director del Hoy Diario del Magdalena, Eduardo Dávila Armenta y tres políticos” (“Prosecutor’s Office Orders Arrest of the Director of Hoy Diario de Magdalena [daily newspaper], Eduardo Dávila Armenta, and Three Politicians”), February 20, 2009. Available at: http://www.verdadabierta.com/web3/parapolitica/magdalena/911-fiscalia-ordena-captura-del-director-del-diario-hoy-del-magdalena-tres-concejales-y-eduardo-davila-armenta (accessed July 23, 2009). The relevant text (my translation): “Members of the CTI [Technical Investigation Team] of the Prosecutor’s office initiated an operation on Friday morning to arrest the director of Hoy Diario del Magdalena, Ulilo Acevedo, and the owner of the Unión Magdalena soccer team, Eduardo Dávila Armenta, and three Santa Marta politicians, for presumed links with paramilitary groups of the region.”
[10] Verdadabierta.com, “Eduardo Dávila Armenta se entrega a la fiscalía” (“Eduardo Dávila Armenta Turns Himself in to the Prosecutor’s Office”)., March 9, 2009. Available at: http://www.verdadabierta.com/web3/parapolitica/1001-eduardo-davila-armenta-se-entrega-a-la-fiscalia (accessed June 24, 2009).
[11] WRadio.com, “Aseguran a Dávila Armenta por homicidio” (“They Hold Dávila Armenta for Homicide”), April 1, 2009. Available at: http://www.wradio.com.co/nota.aspx?id=788339 (accessed August 3, 2009). See also, ElTiempo.com, “Crimen de mujer del ‘jet set’ samario enreda a dueño del Unión Magdalena y a viuda de ex diputado” (“Crime against ‘Jet-Set’ Santa Marta Woman Involves Owner of Unión Magdalena and Widow of ex-Congressman”), undated. Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/crimen-de-mujer-del-jet-set-samario-enreda-a-dueno-del-union-magdalena-y-a-viuda-de-ex-diputado_4947577-1 (accessed August 3, 2009. See also, “ASEGURADO POR HOMICIDIO DÁVILA ARMENTA” (“Dávila Armenta Held for Homicide”), press release from Prosecutor’s Office, April 1, 2009. Available at: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/PAG/DIVULGA/noticias2009/DH/DhDavilaAbr01.htm (accessed July 31, 2009).
[12] Caracol Radio, “Corte Suprema confirma condena de diez años de prisión contra Eduardo Dávila Armenta” (“Supreme Court Confirms 10-Year Sentence Against Eduardo Dávila Armenta”), June 22, 2001. Available at: http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=28308 (accessed July 31, 2009).
[13] Proceso No. 13457, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Criminal Court of Appeals, June 20, 2001. Pg. 9. Available as a read-only document at: http://www.dmsjuridica.com/JURISPRUDENCIA/SALA_PENAL/docs/2001/13457(20-06-01).doc (accessed July 31, 2009).
[14] “Listado Definitivo de Productores Elegibles para Acceder al Incentivo Sanitario para Banano 2008”, supra.
[15] Primerapágina.com, October 6, 2004, supra.
[16] Semana.com, “DAS-GATE,” February 24, 2007 (my translation). Available at: http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/dasgate/101220.aspx (accessed July 25, 2009).
[17] Semana.com, “Relaciones incestuosas” (“Incestuous Relations”), November 18, 2006. My translation. Available at: http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/relaciones-incestuosas/98306.aspx (accessed July 25, 2009).
Filed under: Uncategorized
Please Read. Spanish version in previous post:
December 6, 2009
To:
Coordinating Body of Latin American Banana and Agro-industrial Workers’ Unions – COLSIBA
European Banana Action Network — EUROBAN
U.S. Labor Education in the Americas Project – USLEAP
International Union of Food Workers — IUF
Dear COLSIBA, EUROBAN, USLEAP and IUF:
I write to you today, the 81st Anniversary of the massacre of striking United Fruit Company banana workers in Ciénaga, Magdalena, to inform you that new evidence has emerged of Dole Food Company’s ties to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries. Given that you have been carrying out a campaign since 2006 to condemn Dole’s violation of labor rights, the new evidence should be of special interest to you. José Gregorio Mangones Lugo, alias “Carlos Tijeras,” who commanded the William Rivas Front of the AUC’s Northern Block, has provided a sworn statement which sheds new light on the nature of Dole’s relationship to the AUC paramilitaries. The William Rivas Front operated in the banana zone and surrounding areas in the Colombian province of Magdalena, until it demobilized in 2006. Mangones is currently in jail in Barranquilla, Colombia. Both Dole and Chiquita have for many years exported bananas from this area. A scan of the original affidavit in Spanish can be viewed at http://viewer.zoho.com/docs/xc0ddj. An English translation is available at http://viewer.zoho.com/docs/rcddboi.
In the affidavit, Mangones, who has already confessed to hundreds of murders as part of the “Justice and Peace” process in Colombia, asserts not only that both Dole and Chiquita regularly paid money to the AUC, but that they did so in return for certain “services,” including the murder of unionized banana workers and others who it was suspected could potentially interfere with the two companies’ profitable operations. Though Chiquita confessed to criminal charges that it violated U.S. anti-terrorism laws, the company has claimed that it was a victim of extortion. Dole, for its part, has denied ever making payments to the AUC. The new revelations by Mangones will make it more difficult for Dole to deny the truth, and for Chiquita to continue portraying itself as a victim. International Rights Advocates and the Conrad & Scherer law firm have filed civil lawsuits against both Dole and Chiquita, representing the heirs of approximately 2,000 victims of the AUC in Magdalena and adjacent provinces. The lawsuits can be viewed at http://www.iradvocates.org/dolecase.html (Dole) and http://www.iradvocates.org/chiquitacase.html (Chiquita).
Given that the Magdalena banana zone was the William Rivas Front’s primary area of operation, one of the Front’s “main functions … was to provide security for the banana plantations,” according to Mangones. “The income that the William Rivas Front received from Chiquita and Dole was essential to our operation. In a normal month, 80% to 90% of the income for the William Rivas Front came from the banana companies.” “The AUC even had an open public relationship with the heads of the plantations, whether it be Dole or Chiquita. The AUC moved like fish in water in the banana plantations, because we liberated the banana zone in northern Magdalena [from the FARC guerrillas] and had military control of the territory.” As part of its provision of security to the banana companies, the AUC “guarded the plantations and trucks that carried fruit to the port so that they were not attacked by the guerillas, looted, or robbed by common delinquents, protected their managers, assets, and employees and we made sure that the workers and unions collaborated with the company and would not demand unjust or exaggerated labor claims or be manipulated to carry out banana strikes.” Not all employees were protected, though: “My men were contacted on a regular basis by Chiquita or Dole administrators to respond to a criminal act or address some other problems. We would also get calls from the Chiquita and Dole plantations identifying specific people as ‘security problems’ or just ‘problems.’ Everyone knew that this meant we were to execute the identified person. In most cases those executed were union leaders or members or individuals seeking to hold or reclaim land that Dole or Chiquita wanted for banana cultivation, and the Dole or Chiquita administrators would report to the AUC that these individuals were suspected guerillas or criminals.”
Mangones has provided especially chilling details of Dole’s responsibility for murders in Magdalena: he lists the names of 16 of his victims whom, he states, the AUC murdered because Dole “managers, administrators, supervisors or plantation heads” fingered them as guerrilla “collaborators” or “militiamen.” These 16 are just “a few of the most representative” among “countless examples.” Among the victims were Dole employees, some of them members of SINTRAINAGRO, the banana and agricultural workers’ union. Some other victims listed were members of a peasant association that had invaded land that Dole wanted for banana production. After listing the names of the victims and the places/dates of their extra-judicial executions, Mangones adds, “As I stated earlier, most of the work of the William Rivas Front in the Zona Bananera was on behalf of Chiquita or Dole. Likewise, a large number of the executions we performed can be linked directly to either Dole or Chiquita or both companies.”
Another crucial “service” involved “pacifying” the Magdalena section of the SINTRAINAGRO trade union. In the Urabá region of Antioquia province, Colombia’s larger banana zone, by the mid 1990s SINTRAINAGRO came to be firmly controlled by former EPL guerrillas who demobilized in 1991, and then entered into a strategic alliance with banana growers and the paramilitaries against the Left. But the leadership of the Magdalena section of SINTRAINAGRO remained more politically diverse until the AUC violently imposed its control in 2001. According to Mangones, “We also helped Chiquita and Dole by pacifying the labor union that represented banana workers in the [Magdalena] region. When I became Commander of the William Rivas Front, the union that represented banana workers was SINTRAINAGRO. This was an aggressive, leftist union. I believe they were sympathetic to the FARC. I directed the execution of SINTRAINAGRO’s leftist President, Jose Guette Montero. On January 24, 2001, in Cienaga, near the Olympic supermarket, between 17th Street and 18th Street, we shot Jose Guette Montero and killed him. I then installed Robinson Olivero as President of the union, and to this day, the leaders of SINTRAINAGRO are people the AUC has approved. Once we put our people in charge of SINTRAINAGRO, the union paid me 10% of the union dues it collected on a monthly basis. This union represented workers for both the Dole and Chiquita plantations.”
Given the fact that members of SINTRAINAGRO figure so prominently among the victims of paramilitary violence sponsored by the banana companies, including Dole, it is surprising and disturbing that your campaign against Dole has kept silent regarding these victims, especially since SINTRAINAGRO is both a member of COLSIBA and an affiliate of the IUF. Your primary campaign document, “Dole…Behind the Smokescreen,” recently updated (http://www.bananalink.org.uk/images/stories/documents/2009/new%20dole%20report%2007oct09_eng.pdf), still fails even to mention the anti-union violence perpetrated by the AUC in Colombia, from which Dole has obviously benefitted, particularly in Magdalena. I do not wish to minimize the serious labor-rights violations that your report points out regarding Dole’s banana operations in Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala and West Africa. But let’s face it: they pale in comparison to Dole’s sponsorship of mass murder in Magdalena, Colombia.
One can only hope that you will reconsider and that going forward, your organizations will give Dole’s responsibility for these crimes the central place it deserves in any campaign to highlight this company’s atrocious labor-rights record. Continued silence on the matter, far from lifting Dole’s smokescreen, will only help it spread.
Sincerely,
Bob Perillo
Field Investigator
IRAdvocates
Filed under: Uncategorized
Por favor, leerla:
6 de diciembre del 2009
A:
Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros y Agroindustriales – COLSIBA
Red Europea de Acción sobre el Banano – EUROBAN
Proyecto de Solidaridad Laboral en las Américas – USLEAP
Unión Internacional de los Trabajadores de la Alimentación, Agrícolas, Hoteles, Restaurantes, Tabaco y Afines — UITA
Estimados/as colegas de COLSIBA, EUROBAN, USLEAP, y UITA:
Les escribo hoy, el 81º aniversario de la Masacre de trabajadores en huelga de la United Fruit Company en Ciénaga, Magdalena, para informarles que hay nuevas pruebas sobre los vínculos entre la empresa Dole y el grupo paramilitar Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC –. Como ustedes llevan a cabo desde 2006 una campaña para denunciar las violaciones a los derechos laborales cometidas por Dole, estas pruebas deberían interesarles sobremanera. José Gregorio Mangones Lugo, alias “Carlos Tijeras”, quien fue comandante del Frente William Rivas del Bloque Norte de las AUC, hizo una declaración jurada que arroja nueva luz sobre la relación entre Dole y los paramilitares de las AUC. El Frente William Rivas operó en la zona bananera y áreas colindantes del Departamento de Magdalena hasta que se desmovilizó en el 2006. Actualmente Mangones se encuentra encarcelado en Barranquilla, Colombia. Tanto Dole como Chiquita han exportado bananos durante muchos años de esta zona. Una copia escaneada del original de la declaración está disponible en el siguiente sitio web: http://viewer.zoho.com/docs/xc0ddj. Una traducción al inglés de la misma puede verse en: http://viewer.zoho.com/docs/rcddboi.
Mangones, quien dentro del proceso de “Justicia y Paz” en Colombia ha confesado su responsabilidad en centenares de asesinatos, asevera en su declaración jurada que tanto Dole como Chiquita pagaron regularmente a las AUC por ciertos “servicios”, incluido el asesinato de trabajadores bananeros sindicalizados, así como de otros de los cuales se sospechaba que perjudicaban la rentabilidad de estas empresas. Aunque en un proceso penal Chiquita confesó haber violado las leyes anti-terroristas de los Estados Unidos, la empresa sigue afirmando que fue víctima de extorsión. Dole, por su parte, ha afirmado que nunca ha realizado pago alguno a las AUC. Las nuevas revelaciones de Mangones harán más difícil que Dole siga negando la verdad y que Chiquita siga haciéndose la víctima. International Rights Advocates y el bufete legal de Conrad & Scherer entablaron sendas demandas civiles contra Dole y Chiquita en representación de los familiares de aproximadamente dos mil víctimas de las AUC en Magdalena y en los departamentos adyacentes. Las demandas pueden verse en http://www.iradvocates.org/dolecase.html (Dole) y http://www.iradvocates.org/chiquitacase.html (Chiquita).
En vista de que la zona bananera de Magdalena era la principal base de operaciones del Frente William Rivas, “una de las principales funciones del Frente William Rivas era proveer seguridad a las plantaciones de banano”, según Mangones. “Los ingresos que obtenía el Frente William Rivas de Chiquita y Dole eran esenciales para nuestra operación. En un mes normal, 80% ó 90% de los ingresos del Frente William Rivas provenían de las empresas bananeras”. “…Inclusive, había una relación abierta y pública de las Autodefensas con los capataces de las fincas, sean Dole o Chiquita. Las Autodefensas nos movíamos como pez en el agua en las plantaciones bananeras, porque nosotros liberamos la zona bananera del norte del Magdalena, y teníamos el control militar del territorio”. Como parte del servicio de seguridad prestado a las empresas bananeras, los paramilitares “vigilábamos las plantaciones y los camiones que llevaban la fruta hasta el puerto para que no fueran atacados por la guerrilla, o saqueados o robados por los delincuentes comunes, protegíamos a sus directivos, bienes, y empleados, y estábamos muy pendientes para que los trabajadores y sindicatos colaboraran con la empresa y no hicieran reclamaciones laborales injustas o exageradas o se dejaran convencer por la subversión para promover paros y huelgas bananeros”. Sin embargo, vale decir que no todos los empleados eran protegidos. Según Mangones: “A mis hombres los buscaban regularmente los administradores de Chiquita y de Dole para que les ayudaran frente a una acción criminal o para que les arreglaran otros problemas. También nos llamaban desde las plantaciones de Chiquita y de Dole para identificar a personas específicas como ‘problemas de seguridad’ o simplemente como ‘problemas’. Todo el mundo sabía que esto significaba que teníamos que ejecutar a la persona identificada. En la mayoría de los casos los que cayeron eran líderes o miembros de los sindicatos, o personas que buscaban apropiarse o reclamar terrenos que Dole o Chiquita querían para cultivar banano, y los administradores de Dole y Chiquita les decían a las AUC que estos individuos eran sospechosos de ser guerrilleros o criminales”.
Mangones ha proporcionado detalles especialmente escalofriantes sobre la responsabilidad de Dole de varios asesinatos en Magdalena: incluye un listado de 16 de sus víctimas a quienes, asevera, los asesinaron las AUC porque “gerentes, administradores, supervisores o capataces” de Dole los señalaron de colaboradores o milicianos de la guerrilla. Estas 16 víctimas son algunos de los ejemplos “más representativos” entre “muchísimos más”. Entre las víctimas se encontraban empleados de Dole, algunos de ellos miembros de SINTRAINAGRO, el sindicato bananero y agroindustrial. Otras víctimas eran miembros de una asociación campesina que invadió varios terrenos en donde Dole quería sembrar banano. Abajo del listado de nombres de víctimas con sus respectivas fechas y lugares de ejecución extrajudicial, Mangones agrega lo siguiente: “Como dije anteriormente, gran parte del trabajo del Frente William Rivas en la zona bananera fue a favor de Chiquita o Dole. De igual manera, gran parte de las ejecuciones que llevamos a cabo pueden vincularse o a Dole o Chiquita, o a las dos empresas”.
Otro “servicio” crucial era el de “pacificar” a la subdirectiva de Ciénaga de SINTRAINAGRO. En la región antioqueña del Urabá, la región bananera más grande de Colombia, ex guerrilleros del EPL llegaron a tomar el control total de la dirigencia de SINTRAINAGRO a mediados de los noventas. El EPL se desmovilizó en 1991 y luego hizo una alianza estratégica con empresarios bananeros y con paramilitares en contra de la Izquierda. Por el contrario, la dirigencia de la subdirectiva de Ciénaga, Magdalena, se mantuvo con más diversidad política hasta el 2001, cuando las AUC la sometieron violentamente. Según declaraciones de Mangones: “También le ayudamos a Chiquita y a Dole a pacificar el sindicato que representaba a los trabajadores bananeros de la región. Cuando yo asumí el comando del Frente William Rivas, el sindicato que representaba a los trabajadores del banano era SINTRAINAGRO. Se trataba de un sindicato de izquierda y muy agresivo. Creo que eran simpatizantes de las FARC. Yo ordené la ejecución del Presidente izquierdista de SINTRAINAGRO, José Guette Montero. El 24 de enero de 2001, en Ciénaga, cerca del supermercado Olímpica, le disparamos a José Guette Montero y lo matamos. Entonces yo instalé a Robinson Olivero como presidente del sindicato y hasta el día de hoy los líderes de SINTRAINAGRO son personas aprobadas por las AUC. Una vez que pusimos a nuestra gente a cargo de SINTRAINAGRO, el sindicato me pagaba 10% de las cuotas sindicales que SINTRAINAGRO cobraba mensualmente. Este sindicato representaba a los trabajadores de las plantaciones de ambas empresas, Dole y Chiquita”.
Ante el hecho de que entre las víctimas de la violencia paramilitar patrocinada por las empresas bananeras, Dole incluida, se encuentran tantos miembros de SINTRAINAGRO, es en verdad sorprendente y preocupante que la campaña que ustedes impulsan contra Dole no se haya pronunciado en lo absoluto con respecto a estas víctimas, tanto más porque SINTRAINAGRO es miembro de COLSIBA y afiliado a la UITA. El documento principal de dicha campaña, “Dole…Detrás de la cortina de humo”, recientemente actualizado (http://www.bananalink.org.uk/images/stories/documents/2009/new%20dole%20report%2007oct09_eng.pdf), ni tan siquiera menciona la violencia anti-sindical perpetrada por las AUC en Colombia, de la cual obviamente Dole se ha beneficiado, particularmente en Magdalena. No deseo minimizar las serias violaciones de derechos laborales que “Dole…Detrás de la cortina de humo” señala en las operaciones de esta empresa en Perú, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala y el Oeste de África. Pero permítanme que esto quede muy claro: las violaciones que ustedes denuncian en “Dole… detrás de la cortina de humo” pierden todo su peso si se comparan con el patrocinio de asesinatos masivos como los ordenados justamente por Dole en Magdalena, Colombia.
Espero que ustedes reconsideren sus planteamientos y que sus organizaciones reconozcan el lugar central que debería ocupar la responsabilidad de Dole en estos crímenes en cualquier campaña contra Dole por violaciones de derechos laborales. Más silencio sobre este tema, sin embargo, lejos de levantar la cortina de humo de Dole, sólo la extenderá más.
Atentamente,
Bob Perillo
Investigador de campo
IRAdvocates
Filed under: Uncategorized
There’s no sense in toeing this water; let’s jump in with both feet.
Below you will find a sworn affidavit (pdf) by one Jose Gregorio Magones Lugo AKA Carlos Tijeras, former Commander of the William Rivas front of the AUC (United Self Defense Forces of Colombia). In this declaration, Comandante Tijeras details the relationship between both the Dole and Chiquita fruit companies and his paramilitary organization. It is not pretty. Chiquita claims they were extorted by the AUC while Dole has always maintained that it never made any payments to the AUC.
Comandante Tijeras disagrees on both counts, under oath.
Keep in mind, the AUC wasn’t paid to simply patrol the perimeter of the banana fields to keep out beggars and thieves; they were, in effect, being paid to exert control over the entire region and to exercise said control in a way favorable to Dole and Chiquita by using any and all means necessary. Sections 24 & 26 (24c in particular) show the extent of this arrangement.
Take note that Comandante Tijeras fully expects to be killed for giving this testimony.
He says it much better than I can, so, without further ado, Comandante Carlos Tijeras:
Filed under: Welcome to Banana Land
Banana Land is more than just a geographic location. Banana Land is a situation, and we are all involved. You may not live in the actual “Banana Zone” of Colombia but take a look in your pantry. Chances are, there is a bunch of bright yellow bananas sitting alongside the rest of your produce. This being the case, you, wherever you are in the developed world, play a significant role in the situation that is Banana Land.
The situation is one best characterized by exploitation. Consumers in the developed world are exploited by multinational corporations, in this case Dole and Chiquita, that assume (often correctly) that our ignorance and self-involvement will give them ample cover to continue their odious operations. The land itself is exploited, carpeted with destructive monocultures and saturated with toxic chemicals that have long been banned from use in the developed world. Last, and most important, the people who work in the banana fields are exploited. They are exposed to the same dangerous chemicals that poison the land, forced by circumstance to work grueling, nearly endless shifts, and then terrorized by paramilitaries when they try to organize to gain better terms and conditions. Ultimately, the aforementioned exploitation, in its myriad forms, occurs for one reason: The corporate profits of Dole and Chiquita.
For instance, you will see in the following post (and the following link) that Chiquita has been caught red-handed making payments to the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) (http://viewer.zoho.com/docs/rcddboi).
The AUC is a paramilitary group on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations: (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm)
Remember, it is likely that this company produced the bananas in your pantry.
It doesn’t have to be this way, however, because this situation, the way things are, is largely illusory in regard to its inevitability. Change is the only constant, and this situation is not unique in that respect. Furthermore, it’s in our hands.
We can put an end to the grievous situation that is Banana Land, so let’s get to work.
